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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

There are two schools of thought in statistical analysis, frequentist, and Bayesian. Though the two
approaches produce similar estimations and predictions in large-sample studies, their interpreta
tions are different. Bland Altman analysis is a statistical method that is widely used for comparing
two methods of measurement. It was originally proposed under a frequentist framework, and it has
not been used under a Bayesian framework despite the growing popularity of Bayesian analysis. It
seems that the mathematical and computational complexity narrows access to Bayesian Bland
Altman analysis. In this article, we provide a tutorial of Bayesian Bland Altman analysis. One
approach we suggest is to address the objective of Bland Altman analysis via the posterior
predictive distribution. We can estimate the probability of an acceptable degree of disagreement
(fixed a priori) for the difference between two future measurements. To ease mathematical and
computational complexity, an interface applet is provided with a guideline.

Bland Altman analysis;
reliability study; Bayesian
inference; posterior
predictive distribution;
informative prior

1. Introduction
In exercise science and medical and clinical studies,
researchers want a reliable method of measurement.
When a new method of measurement is developed, it
is compared to the current method (i.e. the gold stan
dard). To test if the two methods of measurement have
an acceptable degree of disagreement, a statistical
method known as Bland Altman analysis is widely
used (Bland & Altman, 1986; Hopkins, 2000; Spineli,
2019; Tytler & Seely, 1986). In a seminar paper, Bland
and Altman (1986) proposed a statistical method (one
that was later named Bland Altman analysis) in which
researchers calculate the mean difference between two
measurements and an interval which is referred to as the
limits of agreement (LOAs). An overview and examples
of reporting absolute agreement indices are provided in
the literature (Giavarina, 2015; Looney, 2018).
There are two competing philosophies in statistics,
frequentist and Bayesian (Bland & Altman, 1998).
Despite the growing popularity of Bayesian analysis,
nearly all (if not all) Bland Altman analysis has been
implemented by a frequentist approach. A Bayesian
approach is found in the literature but the focus was
on repeated measurements (Schluter, 2009) which is
more complex than the original Bland Altman analysis
(which is cited more than 45,000 times as of April 2020).
In this paper, we explore Bland Altman analysis in
a Bayesian framework.

A reason why the frequentist approach may be more
attractive than a Bayesian approach is due to its simple
calculations. In the frequentist approach, approximate
confidence intervals for the true mean difference and the
true (population) LOAs have closed-form expressions.
On the other hand, a Bayesian approach often does not
have a closed-form expression for point and interval
estimations. Instead, researchers must choose an appro
priate model and follow three steps. First, they need to
express their belief about the model parameters (e.g. the
mean, μ, and variance, σ 2 , of a normal distribution)
through a probability model (called a prior). Then they
need to express the likelihood of observing a sample
given the model parameters. Finally, the prior belief
and the likelihood are combined to update their belief
about the model parameters (called a posterior). This
Bayesian analysis often requires multivariate calculus,
increasing computational difficulty. Another crucial
challenge in Bayesian analysis is the specification of
a prior (i.e., what model is appropriate for the prior). If
a prior is not carefully chosen, it may lead to an unrea
sonable posterior, particularly in a small sample size.
One advantage of a Bayesian approach is the utiliza
tion of prior knowledge (because researchers must have
some prior information to eliminate implausible para
meter values), and experienced and knowledgeable
researchers can benefit from Bayesian analysis particu
larly in a small-sample study. For instance, if timing
gates and a stopwatch are compared to measure gait
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speeds of a 20-meter walk (Martin et al., 2019), research
ers probably assume that the expected difference of the
two measurements should not exceed one second or
even one half of a second. Another advantage is the
intuitive and natural interpretation of a result.
Consider, for instance, a frequentist’s 95% confidence
interval. Once a confidence interval is calculated from
a sample, researchers cannot make a probabilistic state
ment (which is commonly done in an incorrect way). In
a frequentist framework, a probability is interpreted as
the proportion of times an event happens when the same
experiment is repeated a large number of times (which is
not realistic in practice). In a Bayesian framework,
a probability can quantify the strength of one’s belief
about an unknown parameter, and the probability can
be updated after observing data (because a belief can
react to new data). Therefore, a Bayesian 95% credible
interval can be interpreted as “researchers believe that
the true (unknown) parameter value is within the inter
val with a probability of 0.95 after observing data” which
is a different interpretation of a frequentist’s 95% con
fidence interval. Though this subjective interpretation is
intuitive, Bayesian analysis has not been used in the past
due to computational complexity. However, computa
tional challenges should not be an issue anymore given
today’s advanced computing tools. In fact, Bland
Altman analysis is a two-parameter problem, so it can
be handled by various computational methods.
In the literature, Bayesian methods are not rare for
complex statistical problems, but we cannot find any for
the relatively simple Bland Altman analysis. Schluter
(2009) wrote “Until now, there have been no published
Bayesian methods focusing on measurement method
comparison studies. This is perhaps surprising given
the increased utilization of Bayesian techniques . . . ”
The popular seminar paper of Bland and Altman
(1986) was published 23 years before Schluter (2009),
and since then, a Bayesian approach to Bland Altman
analysis has not been formulated (to our best knowl
edge). It is probably due to a lack (or absence) of expla
nations of a Bayesian approach for researchers who use
Bland Altman analysis. The aim of this article is to
briefly review the frequentist approach for Bland
Altman analysis (Section 3) and to outline the procedure
for a Bayesian approach (Section 4) with an applied
example (introduced in Section 2.1). In this article, we
suggest assessing the degree of agreement between two
methods of measurement via a posterior predictive dis
tribution (e.g., calculation of the probability that the
absolute difference will be within a fixed value in future
observations) instead of a hypothesis test for the true
(population) LOAs. Since the mathematical and compu
tational contents can be heavy for some readers and

practitioners, an interface R Shiny applet is developed
(https://kalari.shinyapps.io/BBAA/) with a guideline in
the Appendix.
There are tutorials of the Bland and Altman analysis
in frequentist framework (Giavarina, 2015; Looney,
2018), and the LOAs have been widely used in the
research of physical education and exercise science
(Christmas et al., 2017; Kastelic & Šarabon, 2019;
Mason et al., 2020; Kastelic & Monfort-Pañego &
Miñana-Signes, 2020; Overstreet et al., 2016). As
researchers become more experienced, they may be
able (and willing) to express their knowledge before
collecting data (i.e., prior information), and the
Bayesian framework will provide a space to express
their prior information in the statistical analysis. The
intended contributions of this paper are (1) to provide
a Bayesian perspective on comparing two methods of
measurement, (2) to provide the Bayesian approach with
a user-friendly computational applet with a guideline,
and (3) to show how to elicit researchers’ prior knowl
edge in a tractable manner (which is to be combined
with observed data in the Bayesian analysis).

2. Model assumptions
Suppose that we want to analyze the agreement of two
measurement methods. Let Di be the difference between
the two outcomes when the i th subject was measured by
each method for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, where n is a fixed sample
size. Assume D1 ; . . . ; Dn are independent random vari
ables (referred to as the independence assumption). In
addition, assume each Di follows a normal distribution
with some true average difference μ and some true stan
dard deviation σ (referred to as the normality assump
tion). The normality assumption is denoted Di ,Nðμ; σ 2 Þ,
and it is graphically presented in Figure 1. The indepen
dence assumption and the normality assumption are
maintained throughout this paper, whether we use
a frequentist approach (Section 3) or a Bayesian approach
(Section 4).

2.1. Applied example
To illustrate both approaches we will be using the fol
lowing example throughout the manuscript. Gait speed
is a useful predictor of various health outcomes, and is
something that clinicians can measure conveniently.
(Martin et al., 2019). To measure gait speed, a patient
is asked to walk a fixed distance (e.g., 20 meters), and the
time is recorded in seconds. There are two methods of
measuring gait speed (m/s), a timing gate and
a stopwatch. A timing gate is known to be highly
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Figure 1. The normality assumption Di ,Nðμ; σ2 Þ.

accurate and reliable, but it is relatively expensive when
compared to a stopwatch. If the difference between the
measurement by a timing gate and the measurement by
a stopwatch is small, clinicians may prefer a stopwatch.
For the purpose of demonstration, we consider
a hypothetical example based on the estimates by
Martin et al. (2019).
Suppose that a difference of δ ¼ 0:1 seconds is prac
tically negligible when a timing gate and a stopwatch are
used to measure the time for a 20-meter walk (i.e. we are
setting the acceptable limit to be δ ¼ 0:1).
A hypothetical sample of size n ¼ 10 is given in Table
1. Let xi and yi denote the measurements by the timing
gate and by the stopwatch, respectively, and ðxi ; yi Þ are
observed from the ith subject. The difference between the
two measurements is calculated as di ¼ yi xi as shown
in the table. The unknown average difference μ is esti
P
mated by the sample mean d� ¼ n1 ni¼1 di , the sum of n
observed differences divided by n. The unknown var
iance σ 2 is estimated by the sample variance
P
� 2 , the sum of square distances
s2 ¼ n 1 1 ni¼1 ðdi dÞ
between di and d� divided by n 1. The unknown stan
pffiffiffi
dard deviation σ is then estimated by s ¼ s2 . Given the
data in Table 1, the resulting sample mean and sample
standard deviation are d� ¼ 0:066 and s ¼ 0:0237.

3. Frequentist approach
3.1. Limits of agreement and frequentist
interpretation
By the empirical rule under the normality assumption,
a random difference Di (to be observed in the future) is
between μ 1:96σ and μ þ 1:96σ with a probability of

Table 1. A hypothetical sample of size n ¼ 10.
Subject
i
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Measurement by
timing gate (xi )
12.01
11.87
12.41
11.82
12.25
11.87
12.19
12.41
12.30
11.25

Measurement by
stopwatch (yi )
12.05
11.96
12.46
11.92
12.32
11.92
12.27
12.47
12.39
11.28

Difference
di ¼ yi xi
0.04
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.07
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.09 ’
0.03

0.95, and these limits are estimated by l ¼ d� 1:96s and
u ¼ d� þ 1:96s, respectively. Given the data in Table 1, the
resulting 95% limits of agreement (95% LOAs) are l ¼
0:020 and u ¼ 0:112, and the 95% LOAs would be typically
interpreted as “a difference between two measurements will
be between 0.020 and 0.112 seconds with a probability of
0.95.” This interpretation appears to be widely accepted in
literature, but it sounds strange because data collected in
another study will result in different values of 95% LOAs.
An accurate frequentist interpretation is more cumbersome
because the frequentist interpretation of a probability
requires repeating the same experiment (e.g. collecting
a sample of size n ¼ 10) infinitely many times.
From the perspective of statistical theory, the result
ing 95% LOAs ð0:020; 0:112Þ are not intended to capture
a future outcome of Di with a probability of 0.95. If the
sample size n is very large, the aforementioned interpre
tation of 95% LOAs is approximately correct. However,
if researchers really intend to capture a future random
variable Dnþ1 with a probability of 0.95 (regardless of the
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
sample size n), the interval d� � t0:975;n 1 s 1 þ 1 should
n

be used, where t0:975;n

1

¼ 2:262 is the 97.5

th

percentile
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3.2. Hypothesis testing
Giavarina (2015) noted that “the best way to use the
Bland Altman plot would be to define a priori the limits
of maximum acceptable differences (limits of agreement
expected), based on biologically and analytically relevant
criteria, and then to obtain the statistics to see if these
limits are exceeded, or not.” In this regard, two para
meters of interest in the Bland and Altman analysis are
θ1 ¼ μ 1:96σ (lower limit) and θ2 ¼ μ þ 1:96σ (upper
limit), and approximate confidence intervals for these
parameters can be calculated (Bland & Altman, 1986;
Giavarina, 2015; Lu et al., 2016; Stöckl et al., 2004).
Lu et al. (2016) developed a sample size formula for
hypothesis testing H0 : θ1 < δ or θ2 > δ versus H1 : θ1 �
δ and θ2 � δ, where δ (acceptable limit) is fixed before
observing data. At the significance level α ¼ 0:05, the
hypothesis test requires 95% confidence intervals for θ1
and θ2 given by
qffiffiffiffi
2
ðl1 ; u1 Þ ¼ d� 1:96 s � t0:975;n 1 3sn ¼ ð 0:010; 0:049Þ;
qffiffiffiffi
2
ðl2 ; u2 Þ ¼ d� þ 1:96 s � t0:975;n 1 3sn ¼ ð0:083; 0:141Þ;
respectively. Note that these intervals are to capture the
unknown
parameters
θ1 ¼ μ 1:96σ
and
θ2 ¼ μ þ 1:96σ, respectively. According to Lu et al.
(2016), the null hypothesis H0 is rejected (i.e., H1 is
concluded) when
δ < l1 < u2 < δ. Given the data in
Table 1, the resulting 95% confidence intervals are
ðl1 ; u1 Þ ¼ ð 0:010; 0:049Þ for θ1 and ðl2 ; u2 Þ ¼
ð0:083; 0:141Þ for θ2 , so H0 is not rejected at α ¼ 0:5
because u2 ¼ 0:141 is greater than δ ¼ 0:1. In this con
text, we have a lack of evidence to conclude that the
timing gate and the stopwatch are practically different.

agreement, H1 : θ1 > 0:1 and θ2 < 0:1 can be expressed
as μ 1:96σ > 0:1 and μ þ 1:96σ < 0:1. These two
inequalities are equivalent to σ < a þ bμ and σ < a bμ
0:1
1
respectively, where a ¼ 1:96
and b ¼ 1:96
. The two
inequalities are represented by the shaded zone in
Figure 2.
We can calculate a credible interval and see if it covers
a portion of ROPE (Kruschke, 2015). Since we have
a two-dimensional ROPE for ðμ; σÞ, we need to calculate
a credible region (Note: the term “credible interval” is
used for one parameter, and the term “credible region” is
used for two or more parameters). Alternatively, we can
calculate the posterior probability of H1 to quantify the
updated belief that the true parameter values are within
the fixed ROPE.
3.4. Alternative perspective of acceptable
agreement
Note that hypothesis testing and confidence intervals
are used to make statements about unknown para
meters (not future outcomes). Kim and Wand (2020)
discussed a strange case in the hypothesis testing dis
cussed in Section 3.2. For instance, let δ ¼ 0:1, and
assume the true parameter values are μ ¼ 0:05 and
σ ¼ 0:03. In this case, θ2 ¼ μ þ 1:96σ ¼ 0:1088 exceeds
δ ¼ 0:1 (i.e., H0 is true), but Pð δ < Di < δÞ ¼ 0:9522
exceeds 0.95 (which may be an acceptable probability
of agreement). The two statements “H1 : θ1 � δ and
θ2 � δ” and “Pð δ � Di � δÞ � 0:95” are not equiva
lent (Kim & Wand, 2020). The former statement is
regarding the two parameters θ1 ¼ μ 1:96σ and
θ2 ¼ μ þ 1:96σ, and the latter statement is regarding
Region of Practical Equivalence
δ = 0.1

0.00

0.02

σ

3.3. Region of practical equivalence
The idea of fixing the practically acceptable difference δ
can be viewed as a region of practical equivalence
(ROPE) in Bayesian inference. All possible values of
ðμ; σÞ can be partitioned into two regions: (i) a small
region where the two methods of measurement are
practically the same (i.e., close enough) and (ii) else
where (not close enough). In the formulated hypothesis
testing, H1 represents the small region, and H0 repre
sents elsewhere. For example, if δ ¼ 0:1 is the maximum
acceptable difference between the two methods of

ROPE

0.06

of the T distribution with n 1 degrees of freedom (e.g.,
t0:975;9 ¼ 2:262). Given the data in Table 1, the resulting
interval would be (0.010, 0.122), and this is called the
prediction interval (Geisser, 1993).

0.04
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−0.2

−0.1

0.0

0.1

µ

Figure 2. The region of practical equivalence (ROPE).
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the random variable Di . The researcher’s perspective is
crucial to determine the method of analysis. If we focus
directly on Di and its observed future value, an alter
native perspective of the acceptable agreement should
be based on the probability Pð δ � Di � δÞ.
Researchers who are more interested in answering the
probabilistic question “What is the probability that the
difference between two measurements (to be observed
in future) is within ð δ; δÞ ¼ ð 0:1; 0:1Þ” should use
this alternative perspective. This question can be
answered in a Bayesian approach (specifically at the
end of Section 4.4).

4. Bayesian approach
In literature, the term “frequentist” has been rarely
(or never) used for the current practice of Bland
Altman analysis because a Bayesian approach has
not been considered by many (and most) researchers.
We believe that the frequentist approach gained
popularity because of simple formulas and easy cal
culations. A Bayesian approach involves more mathe
matics and programming, but it is more flexible (in
terms of addressing a research question) and easier to
provide a probabilistic interpretation (as opposed to
the frequentist interpretation of a probability which
requires the hypothetical assumption of repeated
experiments; Section 3.1).
For readers who are unfamiliar with Bayesian meth
ods, van de Schoot et al. (2014) provided a gentle intro
duction to Bayesian analysis. Kruschke (2015) wrote
a book about Bayesian analysis with concrete examples
and programming codes. Bland and Altman (1998)
wrote a short article to compare between frequentist
and Bayesian analysis.
Under the normality assumption (Section 2), the
model parameters are μ and σ which are unknown and
to be estimated after observing data. For mathematical
convenience, the standard deviation σ is transformed to
τ ¼ σ12 which is referred to as precision. Given the pre
cision τ, the standard deviation is σ ¼ p1ffiτffi . A greater
precision means a smaller standard deviation (i.e. the
two methods of measurement tend to agree more). In
other words, τ is just an alternative way of quantifying
uncertainty. A Bayesian inference for ðμ; τÞ requires
three steps.
i. Model data, ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ or simply ~
d. The probabil
ity model for ~
d given the model parameters ðμ; τÞ is
~
denoted by f ðdjμ; τÞ, and it is referred to as the likelihood
function or simply likelihood (Section 4.1). It quantifies
the likelihood of observing ~
d if the values of the model
parameters ðμ; τÞ are given.

5

ii. Model researcher’s belief about ðμ; τÞ via
a probability model f ðμ; τÞ prior to observing data
ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ. The probability model f ðμ; τÞ is referred
to as the prior distribution or the prior density function
(Section 4.2). For example, if f ð0; 4Þ ¼ 0:2 and
f ð0; 1Þ ¼ 0:1, the researcher is expressing that μ ¼ 0
and τ ¼ 4 (σ ¼ 0:5) is twice more plausible than μ ¼ 0
and τ ¼ 1 (σ ¼ 1). Since μ can be any real number and τ
can be any positive real number, we need a mathematical
function f ðμ; τÞ to model researcher’s belief efficiently.
iii. Update the researcher’s belief about ðμ; τÞ given
data ~
d. The updated probability model for ðμ; τÞ given ~
d
~
is denoted by f ðμ; τjdÞ, and it is referred to as the poster
ior distribution or the posterior density function (Section
4.3). All statistical inferences are from the updated
model f ðμ; τj~
dÞ, and it is derived by combining the
prior f ðμ; τÞ and the likelihood f ð~
djμ; τÞ (Note: they
are combined using Bayes theorem, hence the name
Bayesian inference).

4.1. Likelihood
Under the independence assumption and the normality
assumption given μ and τ ¼ σ12 , the likelihood of obser
ving ~
d is quantified as
f ð~
djτ; μÞ ¼

n
Q
i¼1

τ
2π

�12

e

τðdi μÞ2
2

τ
�
n
/ τ 2 e 2½nvþnðd

2

μÞ

�

(1)

P
P
� 2 . To quan
where d� ¼ n1 ni¼1 di and v ¼ n1 ni¼1 ðdi dÞ
tify the likelihood, we do not need to know all individual
values of ~
d ¼ ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ, and it is sufficient to sum
marize the data by the two statistics d� and v (referred to
as sufficient statistics). Note that the sample variance in
P
� 2,
the frequentist approach is s2 ¼ n 1 1 ni¼1 ðdi dÞ
n 1 2
so v ¼ n s .
4.2. Prior
A popular prior distribution for the normal model para
meters ðμ; τÞ is the normal-gamma distribution which is
given by
1

f ðμ; τÞ / τ a0 2 e

b0 τ

e

λ0 τðμ μ0 Þ2
2

(2)

for 1 < μ < 1 and τ > 0. The values of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ
are chosen to reflect the researcher’s state of knowledge
about ðμ; τÞ before observing data ~
d. The value of μ0
reflects the best guess of μ, and the value of λ0 reflects the
pseudo sample size (i.e. given τ, a larger value of λ0
makes the prior belief about μ stronger). It will be
shown (in Equation (6) of Section 4.3) that μ0 and λ0
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are combined with d� and n to determine a posterior
estimate for μ, and λ0 can be interpreted as the relative
amount of information when μ is estimated by
� The value of a0 0:5
a weighted average of μ0 and d.
b0
reflects the best guess of τ, and a smaller value of a0
and a larger value of b0 make the prior belief of τ
stronger. However, a0 and b0 also affect the strength of
the prior belief about μ, so it is not simple to accurately
choose the values of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ by trial and error. To
specify the prior in a tractable manner, guidance is
provided in Section 4.5. Note that Equation (2) is often
denoted by
ðμ; τÞ,N Gða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ ;
the subscript “0” is used to emphasize that these are the
parameters of the prior distribution.
In practice, Bayesian analyses are commonly per
formed by “letting data speak out.” In other words,
when researchers do not have useful prior information
about ðμ; τÞ, values of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ may be chosen in
a certain way such that the prior f ðμ; τÞ has negligible
influence on the posterior f ðμ; τj~
dÞ. In this case, the
posterior f ðμ; τj~
dÞ would be dominated by the likelihood
~
f ðdjτ; μÞ. For instance, if we are uninformed about
ðμ; τÞ, we may choose a0 ¼ 0:5, b0 ¼ 0:000001, μ0 ¼ 0,
and λ0 ¼ 0:000001, and the prior distribution (modeled
by the normal-gamma distribution in Equation (2))
becomes
f ðμ; τÞ / e

0:000001τ

e

0:000001τðμÞ2
2

4.3. Posterior
The Bayesian inference follows the spirit of the Bayes’
theorem
~
djμ; τÞ f ðμ; τÞ ;
f ðμ; τj~
dÞ ¼ f ðdjμ;τÞ~f ðμ;τÞ / f ð~
f ðdÞ

(3)

where the likelihood f ð~
djμ; τÞ is in Equation (1) and the
prior f ðμ; τÞ is in Equation (2). The function f ð~
dÞ is
called the marginal likelihood, but it is not important
for our purposes. Using Bayes’ theorem in Equation (3),
the posterior distribution is given by
f ðμ; τj~
dÞ / f ð~
djμ; τÞ f ðμ; τÞ
2
τ
�
n
1
/ τ 2 e 2½nvþnðd μÞ � τ a20 2 e
λ1 τðμ μ1 Þ
1
/ τ a1 2 e b1 τ e 2
;

b0 τ

e

λ0 τðμ μ0 Þ2
2

(4)

where
a1

¼ a0 þ n2

b1

�
2�
λ ðd� μ Þ
¼ b0 þ n2 v þ 0 λ0 þn0

μ1
λ1

¼ 0λ00þn
¼ λ0 þ n:

�
λ μ þnd

(5)

The subscript “0” is used to signify a parameter of the
prior distribution (as noted above) while the subscript
“1” signifies a parameter for the posterior distribution.
Note that the posterior distribution presented in
Equation (4) is in the form of the normal-gamma
model (compare to Equation (2)), and we denote the
posterior distribution by

�

¼ 1:

This prior distribution will not affect the posterior dis
tribution. It is because the posterior inference is based
on the product of the likelihood f ð~
djτ; μÞ and the prior
f ðμ; τÞ (Equation ((3)) in Section 4.3). To this end, if
�
f ðμ; τÞ ¼ 1, the posterior will be dominated by the data
(likelihood) only. When researchers want to incorporate
substantive prior information about the parameters
ðμ; τÞ, appropriate values of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ can be
found by a tractable manner (see Section 4.5).
Note that the normal-gamma prior is not the only
way of specifying a prior. There are many forms of
f ðμ; τÞ that researchers may choose. For example, if
researchers are finding it challenging to express their
prior beliefs about μ and τ simultaneously, one can
choose a prior model f ðμÞ for μ (often a normal
model) and a prior model f ðτÞ for τ independently,
and by the definition of independence in probability
theory, one can let f ðμ; τÞ ¼ f ðμÞ f ðτÞ. In this case, the
forms of f ðτÞ and f ðμÞ are flexible as long as they are
legitimate probability models on the possible values of τ
and μ (i.e. τ > 0 and 1 < μ < 1).

ðμ; τÞj~
d,N Gða1 ; b1 ; μ1 ; λ1 Þ :
In other words, the prior knowledge expressed via the
normal-gamma model N Gða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ is updated by
the normal-gamma model N Gða1 ; b1 ; μ1 ; λ1 Þ by updat
ing the old values of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ with the new values
of ða1 ; b1 ; μ1 ; λ1 Þ after observing a sample of size n. In
Equation (5), note that μ1 (referred to as the posterior
mean of μ) can be expressed as
0
μ1 ¼ λ0λþn
μ0 þ λ0nþn d� :

(6)

It is a weighted average of μ0 (prior guess for μ) and d�
(sample mean to estimate μ) weighted by λ0 and n,
respectively. Therefore, λ0 and n can be interpreted as
the contribution of the prior and data, respectively, to
the posterior inference for μ. To this end, researchers
can gauge how strong their prior belief about μ was
relative to the sample size n.
In summary, the Bayesian inference is based on the
� v; a0 ; b0 ; μ ; λ0 Þ which constitute
seven numbers ðn; d;
0
ða1 ; b1 ; μ1 ; λ1 Þ. The analytic approach to the posterior
f ðμ; τj~
dÞ requires some calculus. Without a background
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in calculus, the posterior f ðμ; τj~
dÞ still can be analyzed
numerically using Gibbs sampling, and an example is
given in Section 4.4. A more detailed explanation of the
Gibbs sampling can be found in Supplemental Note 1.

4.4. Applied example
Consider the same data in Section 3.3, and suppose
a prior is fixed at a0 ¼ 0:5, b0 ¼ 0:000001, μ0 ¼ 0, and
λ0 ¼ 0:000001 to express very weak prior knowledge
about ðμ; τÞ as discussed in Section 4.2. A sample
R code for Gibbs sampling is given in Supplemental
Note 2. The function named BA.Bayesian in the
Supplemental Note 2 should be loaded in R, then the
following lines can be submitted to input the data ~
d¼
ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ and to run the function.
### Input data (difference between two measurements)
data = c(0.04, 0.09, 0.05, 0.1, 0.07, 0.05, 0.08, 0.06,
0.09, 0.03)
### Run BA.Bayesian function
BA.Bayesian(d = data, delta = 0.1, a0 = 0.5, b0 = 1e-6,
mu0 = 0, lambda0 = 1e-6)
After running this code, R outputs the following
posterior inference for ðμ; σ; θ1 ; θ2 Þ and the posterior
distributions seen in Figure 3.
$post
mean 2.5% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 97.5%
mu 0.066 0.051 0.054 0.061 0.066 0.071 0.078 0.081
sigma 0.023 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.022 0.026 0.033 0.037
theta1 0.021 − 0.010 − 0.003 0.014 0.023 0.030 0.038
0.041
theta2 0.111 0.091 0.093 0.102 0.109 0.118 0.135 0.142
diff 0.066 0.016 0.026 0.051 0.066 0.081 0.105 0.115
$post.h1
[1] 0.1853
$post.pred.agree
[1] 0.9233
The posterior distributions in Figure 3 are interpreted
as follows:
• Upper left panel: After observing the sample
ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ of size n ¼ 10, we are 95% sure that μ is
between 0.051 and 0.081 (vertical dashed lines), and the
interval (0.051, 0.081) is called a 95% credible interval (CI)
for μ. The posterior distribution of μ is centered at 0.066

(the vertical solid line, indicating the average of the poster
ior distribution), and 0.066 is called the posterior mean of μ.
• Upper middle panel: The posterior mean of σ is
0.023, and a 95% CI for σ is (0.015, 0.037).
• Upper right panel: The two parameters of interest
are θ1 ¼ μ 1:96σ and θ2 ¼ μ þ 1:96σ, and θ1 and θ2
depend on the two model parameters μ and σ jointly.
The scatter plot provides the joint posterior distribution
of ðμ; σÞ, and the dotted line represents the boundary
between the null hypothesis H0 : θ1 < 0:1 or θ2 > 0:1
and the alternative hypothesis H1 : θ1 � 0:1 and
θ2 � 0:1. The inner zone represents H1 , and the propor
tion of ðμ; σÞ located inside the zone of H1 is 0.183 which
is called the posterior probability of H1 . After observing
the data, we believe H1 is true with a probability 0.183.
• Lower left panel: The posterior mean of θ1 ¼ μ
1:96σ is 0.021, and a 95% CI for θ1 is (–0.011, 0.041).
• Lower middle panel: The posterior mean of θ2 ¼
μ þ 1:96σ is 0.111 with a 95% CI (0.091, 0.142).
Note that all, but one, of the observed differences
d1 ; . . . ; d10 are within 0.1 seconds (with one boundary
case d4 ¼ 0:1), and the posterior probability of H1 is as
low as 0.183.
There are infinitely many 95% CIs for a parameter.
In the above results, a 95% CI is calculated by the 2.5 th
percentile and the 97.5 th percentile of the posterior
distribution, and it is referred to as the central CI.
When the posterior distribution is unimodal (i.e.
a single peak), we can find the shortest interval as
follows (Section 25.2.2 of Kruschke, 2015). Note that
the 1st percentile and the 96th percentile can serve as
a 95% CI, and the 1.5 th percentile and the 96.5 th
percentile can serve as another 95% CI. Among infi
nitely many 95% CIs, the shortest CI is called the high
est (posterior) density interval (HDI), and it provides
a more precise (shorter) interval estimation when the
posterior distribution is skewed (e.g. for σ in Figure 3).
See Table 2 to compare the length of the central 95% CI
and the length of 95% HDI for each parameter. The
lengths are the same for μ because the posterior dis
tribution of μ is symmetric, and the length of HDI is
slightly shorter for σ, θ1 , and θ2 , but the difference
seems negligible (about 0.002–0.003 seconds). When
the posterior distribution is multimodal (i.e. multiple
peaks), a different method of finding HDI is needed

Table 2. The central 95% CI and the 95% HDI for μ, σ, θ1 , and θ2
Parameter
μ
σ
θ1
θ2

Central 95% CI
(0.051, 0.081)
(0.015, 0.037)
(−0.010, 0.041)
(0.091, 0.142)

length
0.030
0.022
0.051
0.051

7

95% HDI
(0.051, 0.081)
(0.014, 0.034)
(−0.005, 0.043)
(0.089, 0.137)

Length
0.030
0.020
0.048
0.048

Lower %
2.5%
0.7%
3.9%
0.8%

Upper %
97.5%
95.7%
98.9%
95.8%
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Figure 3. Posterior distributions of ðμ; σ; θ1 ; θ2 Þ.

according to the formal definition of an HDI (Section
4.3.4 of Kruschke, 2015).
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the question of interest
is the probability that the difference between the two
measurements will be between ð δ; δÞ ¼ ð 0:1; 0:1Þ in
~ be a random difference
the future. In this regard, let D
(comparing stopwatch to timing gates) to be observed in
~ (informed by
the future. The probability model of D
observed data ~
d) is referred to as the posterior predictive
distribution, and it is shown in Figure 4 (generated by

the R code in the Supplemental Note 2). As shown in the
R outputs given earlier in this section, we are 95% sure
that the difference will be between 0.016 and 0.115 (2.5%
and 97.5% of the row named diff), and we believe that
the difference will be within δ ¼ 0:1 seconds with
a probability of 0.9233 (post.pred.agree) which we
~ � δj~
denoted as Pð δ � D
dÞ ¼ 0:9233.
Recalling our applied example from section 2.1, if the
probability of 0.9233 is an acceptable level of agreement
(which should be judged based on practical

Posterior Predictive Distribution

−0.10

−0.05

0.00

0.05
~
d

~
Figure 4. Posterior predictive distribution of D.

0.10
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significance), the stopwatch should be recommended
rather than the more expensive timing gates.
Otherwise, the stopwatch should not be recommended
as a replacement for the timing gates.
According to Bayesian theory, the posterior predic
~ follows a scaled and shifted
tive distribution of D
T distribution (Murphy, 2007). It can be generated
from Nðμ; σÞ by using posterior samples of ðμ; σÞ, and
~ � δ can be
the posterior probability of
δ�D
approximated numerically.

4.5. Prior specification
The Bayesian (posterior) inference is a combination of
prior knowledge and empirical evidence (data). So far,
we have considered the vague prior a0 ¼ 0:5,
b0 ¼ 0:000001, μ0 ¼ 0, and λ0 ¼ 0:000001, which does
not substantially influence the posterior inference.
However, researchers are sometimes knowledgeable (or
have a strong opinion) about the model parameters
ðμ; τÞ, where τ ¼ σ12 (i.e., σ ¼ p1ffiτffi ). The most distinguish
able feature of Bayesian inference (compared to frequen
tist inference) is the influence of prior, in our context the
choice of ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ. As aforementioned in Section
4.2, it is fairly challenging to specify ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ which
properly reflects the researcher’s prior knowledge, so we
introduce an induced prior specification in this section
(Christensen et al., 2011).
For an induced prior specification on the parameters
μ and σ ¼ p1ffiτffi , researchers can be asked the following
questions: (1) What is your best guess for σ? Call it σ^. (2)
What is the upper bound uσ such that you (researcher)
believe that Pðσ � uσ Þ ¼ 0:95? (3) What is the lower
bound lμ and upper bound uμ for the mean difference
μ such that you believe that Pðlμ � μ � uμ Þ ¼ 0:95?
For the purpose of demonstration, suppose
a researcher (who has been involved in walk studies
in the past) provided the following answers: (1) My best
guess for the standard deviation σ (of the difference
between two measurements) is σ^ ¼ 0:05 (estimated by
the sample standard deviation of the previous study).
(2) I am 95% sure that the standard deviation σ does
not exceed uσ ¼ 0:1, that is Pðσ < 0:1Þ ¼ 0:95 (a guess
based on previous experiences; unlikely that σ exceeds
0.1 seconds in a walk study). (3) I am 95% sure that the
average difference μ is between lμ ¼ 0:5 and uμ ¼ 0:5
seconds, that is Pð 0:5 � μ � 0:5Þ ¼ 0:95 (a guess
based on experience; quite certain that jμj is within
0.5 seconds). By the specified values, σ^ ¼ 0:05,
uσ ¼ 0:1, lμ ¼ 0:5, and uμ ¼ 0:5, we can find
ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ ¼ ð2:71; 0:0093; 0; 0:086Þ. A method of
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finding these values is described in the Supplemental
Note 3 for readers who are interested in the thorough
mathematics behind the scenes, but these calculations
are automatically done in the interface R Shiny applet,
so it is not required by users. Users are asked to input
ð^
σ ; uσ ; lμ ; uμ Þ as described in the Appendix. Otherwise,
the uninformed (vague) prior used in Section 4.2 is
implemented by default.
Using this informative prior and the same data, the
posterior inference is as follows:
> BA.Bayesian(d = data, delta = 0.1, a0 = 2.71,
b0 = 0.00093, mu0 = 0, lambda0 = 0.086)
$post
mean 2.5% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 97.5%
mu 0.065 0.051 0.053 0.061 0.065 0.070 0.077 0.080
sigma 0.023 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.033
theta1 0.021 − 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.022 0.029 0.037 0.039
theta2 0.110 0.092 0.094 0.102 0.109 0.116 0.130 0.135
difference 0.065 0.017 0.025 0.049 0.065 0.081 0.104
0.113
$post.h1
[1] 0.1734
$post.pred.agree
[1] 0.9278
The above results are fairly close to the results with
the vague prior in Section 4.4 because the amount of
prior information λ0 ¼ 0:086 was relatively small
(when compared to the sample size n ¼ 10). As
shown in Equation (6) of Section 4.3, the posterior
mean of μ is
0 : 086
10
ð0Þ þ
ð0:066Þ
0:086 þ 10
0:086 þ 10
¼ 0:0085ð0Þ þ 0:9915ð0:066Þ ¼ 0:065:

μ1 ¼

In words, the sample mean d� ¼ 0:066 is weighted by
0.9915 and the prior guess μ0 ¼ 0 is weighted by 0.0085
in the posterior estimation for μ.
The impact of a prior specification can be substantial
particularly when λ0 is large relative to n and a prior
guess deviates from observed data. For the purpose of
demonstrating this point, let us consider another prior
given by σ^ ¼ 0:1, uσ ¼ 0:25, lμ ¼ 0:1, and uμ ¼ 0:1
which results in ða0 ; b0 ; μ0 ; λ0 Þ ¼ ð1:68; 0:027; 0; 14:38Þ
(using the R Shiny applet). This prior is fairly strong in
a sense that λ0 ¼ 14:38 is greater than the sample size
n ¼ 10. Furthermore, the prior guess σ^ ¼ 0:1 with
Pðσ < 0:25Þ ¼ 0:95 appears to be an overestimate rela
tive to the observed sample standard deviation
s ¼ 0:0237. Given the same data presented in the pre
vious example, this strong prior (which conflicts with
the observed data) results in the following posterior
inference.
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$post
mean 2.5% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 97.5%
mu 0.027 − 0.008 − 0.002 0.016 0.027 0.038 0.056 0.062
sigma 0.085 0.058 0.061 0.072 0.082 0.094 0.119 0.129
theta1 − 0.139 − 0.234 − 0.212 − 0.160 − 0.132 − 0.111 − 0.086
− 0.079
theta2 0.193 0.133 0.140 0.165 0.187 0.214 0.267 0.287
difference 0.028 − 0.146 − 0.116 − 0.029 0.027 0.086
0.172 0.202
$post.h1
[1] 0
$post.pred.agree
[1] 0.7311
In this case, the posterior mean for μ is calculated by
the weighted average
14:38
10
μ1 ¼ 14:38þ10
ð0Þ þ 14:38þ10
ð0:066Þ ¼ 0:027

which is closer to the prior guess μ0 ¼ 0 rather than the
data d� ¼ 0:066. In addition, the posterior mean 0.085 for
σ is substantially closer to the prior guess σ^ ¼ 0:1 rather
than the data s ¼ 0:0237. Since this strong prior
expressed relatively large σ (when compared to the pre
~ � 0:1j~
vious prior), Pð 0:1 � D
dÞ ¼ 0:7311 is substan
tially smaller than the previously resulting probability of
0.9278.
To critique the influence of a prior, it is recom
mended to revisit Equation (4) in Section 4.3. The pos
terior values ða1 ; b1 ; λ1 ; μ1 Þ are determined by prior
� vÞ. In particular, a large
ða0 ; b0 ; λ0 ; μ0 Þ and data ðn; d;
value of λ0 is highly influential when a prior guess μ0 and
an estimate d� for μ are distant. In addition, the prior can
be affected by the difference between a prior guess σ^ and
pffiffi
an estimate (s or v) for σ. In practice, the posterior
result from a strong prior and the posterior result from
a vague prior (e.g. the prior first introduced in Section
4.4) are compared to critique the prior influence.

5. Discussion
Although Bland Altman analysis is not new to the litera
ture, there is very little on Bland Altman analysis through
a Bayesian lens. To this end, our goal was to provide
researchers a Bayesian framework to complete Bland
Altman analysis. We summarize this procedure as fol
lows: (1) specify a normal-gamma prior on ðμ; τÞ, where
τ ¼ 1=σ, (2) conduct Gibbs sampling for a posterior
sample of ðμ; τÞ, (3) summarize the posterior distribution
of ðμ; τÞ and any combination of ðμ; τÞ such as μ � 1:96σ,
and (4) summarize the posterior predictive distribution
for future outcomes to assess the degree of agreement
between two different methods of measurement for

a given threshold value of δ. To help researchers navigate
a prior specification and reduce the technical challenges,
an applet (https://kalari.shinyapps.io/BBAA/) is provided.
While the Bayesian approach is more computation
ally expensive, it has some benefits that the frequentist
approach does not have. The Bayesian method allows
researchers to incorporate their prior knowledge in their
analysis. Researchers should have at least some knowl
edge to rule out implausible values of ðμ; σÞ, and it is
useful especially in a small-sample (pilot) study. In addi
tion, the interpretation of the posterior probability
~ � δj~
Pð δ � D
dÞ is more intuitive and more reflective
of what researchers seek (the probability of seeing an
acceptable difference). It provides a simple probabilistic
statement regarding the future difference between two
measures in the Bayesian framework. In the frequentist
framework, a resulting 95% LOAs ðl; uÞ is also
a statement about the future difference between two
measures, but an accurate interpretation of the resulting
ðl; uÞ cannot be directly related to the probability of
seeing an acceptable difference. According to the fre
quentist interpretation of probability, it requires the
hypothetical assumption of repeating the same experi
ment (to calculate l and u) and repeating future observa
tions (to see if the future difference is between l and u).
As we repeat the same experiment, values of l and u will
vary, so the interpretation of an observed ðl; uÞ is not
straightforward. In addition, resulting 95% confidence
intervals ðl1 ; u1 Þ for θ1 ¼ μ 1:96σ and ðl2 ; u2 Þ for θ2 ¼
μ 1:96σ are statements about the model parameters,
and an accurate interpretation of ðl1 ; u2 Þ in the frequen
tist framework can be challenging for many practi
tioners. The interval ðl1 ; u2 Þ is intended to capture both
parameters θ1 and θ2 , and it does not make a direct
statement about the probability of capturing the future
difference between the two measures.
The choice of a prior can be impactful on the posterior
result. It may be difficult to set a threshold to flag that
a prior has a poor effect on the posterior analysis. If two
priors (e.g., a prespecified prior and a vague prior) result in
substantially different posterior results, it may signify that
the sample size n is too small (relatively to the amount of
prior information λ0 ), so they may consider continuing
data collection. The authors strongly believe that research
ers should not change a prespecified prior after seeing the
posterior result. The prior must be independent of
observed data, and changing the prior after observing
data is double-dipping the data (inflating the amount of
information contained in the data). If researchers are con
cerned about the prior sensitivity, the vague prior (the
default option in the R Shiny applet) would be a safe
option.
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While the frequentist approach to Bland Altman
analysis is widely used and is fairly simple to implement,
the Bayesian Bland Altman analysis can be advantageous
in helping researchers better understand and interpret
their results. With today’s advanced technology, per
forming Bayesian inference is no longer a labored task.
The process of constructing an informative prior and
assessing the agreement between two methods of mea
surement via a posterior predictive distribution can be
an alternative criterion for researchers to determine one
measurement method over the other.
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Appendix: R Shiny Applet Guideline
In order to aid researchers with the computational com
plexity of Bayesian Bland Altman analysis, an R Shiny
applet is developed. A user inputs (1) a value of δ, the
acceptable degree of disagreement between the two meth
ods of measurement, (2) ~
d ¼ ðd1 ; . . . ; dn Þ, the data of n
differences, (3) a choice of prior described below, (4)
a statistic for checking the normality assumption by the
posterior predictive p-value, and (5) the size of a posterior
sample (default: 10,000). To check the normality assump
tion, the posterior predictive p-value is used (Gelman et al.,
2013). An extremely small or large p-value indicates devia
tion from the normality assumption. The app provides two
options for a statistic: the proportion of
δ < di < δ and
skewness. Since the proportion is more meaningful from

the practical perspective, it is set as default. A researcher
has the following six options for choosing a prior.
• Vague prior (set as default): a0 ¼ 0:5, b0 ¼ 0:000001,
μ0 ¼ 0, and λ0 ¼ 0:000001 as described in Section 4.2 and
applied in Section 4.4.
• Normal-gamma prior with a0 , b0 , μ0 , and λ0 : A user
chooses values of a0 , b0 , μ0 , and λ0 to reflect one’s prior
knowledge.
• Normal-gamma prior with σ^, uσ , lμ , and uμ : A user chooses
values of σ^, uσ , lμ , and uμ by answering the three questions in
Section 4.5. The user does not need to find the values of a0 , b0 ,
μ0 , and λ0 . The applet does for the user.
• Independent normal and gamma priors with a0 , b0 , μ0 ,
and λ0 : This prior assumes μ,Nðμ0 ; 1=λ0 Þ and
τ,Gammaða0 ; b0 Þ independently. A user chooses values of
a0 , b0 , μ0 , and λ0 to reflect one’s prior knowledge.
• Independent normal and gamma priors with σ^, uσ , lμ , and
uμ : A user chooses values of σ^, uσ , lμ , and uμ by answering the
three questions in Section 4.5. The user does not need to find
the values of a0 , b0 , μ0 , and λ0 . The applet does for the user
under the independent assumption μ,Nðμ0 ; 1=λ0 Þ and
τ,Gammaða0 ; b0 Þ.
• Independent uniform (flat) priors with lσ , uσ , lμ , and uμ .
A user assumes that all possible values of ðμ; σÞ are equally
plausible for lμ < μ < uμ and lσ < σ < uσ . In other words, the
user specifies arbitrarily wide boundaries for μ and σ.
After receiving the user’s inputs, the applet produces
posterior results, graphics seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4,
and interpretations of some key posterior results. The
figures for the posterior distributions can be saved by
right clicking on the image and choosing “save image as.”

